Security: Blocks all 20 real-world ROP exploits from the ROPBench suite in simulation, including those bypassing Intel CET shadow stack via partial overwrite. The ZRIF Key shifts trust from memory layout (ASLR) or separate stacks to a cryptographic isolation primitive bound to execution context. Its main advantage is resilience against memory disclosure – even with full stack read, an attacker cannot derive valid return MACs without the key. Future work includes formal verification of the ZRIF state machine and integration with Intel SGX/AMD SEV for enclave return protection. 7. Conclusion We presented ZRIF Key, a hardware primitive that uses a keyed MAC and an isolation flag to protect return addresses against zero-day ROP attacks. By moving return integrity into a hidden CPU register, ZRIF closes a long-standing gap in control-flow integrity without requiring static analysis or separate shadow stack memory. The small performance and hardware cost make it suitable for next-generation secure processors. Keywords : Return-oriented programming, ZRIF key, control-flow integrity, hardware security, trusted execution.
Memory overhead: +8 bytes per return slot vs. +8 bytes for shadow stack + separate region management. zrif key
Security: Blocks all 20 real-world ROP exploits from the ROPBench suite in simulation, including those bypassing Intel CET shadow stack via partial overwrite. The ZRIF Key shifts trust from memory layout (ASLR) or separate stacks to a cryptographic isolation primitive bound to execution context. Its main advantage is resilience against memory disclosure – even with full stack read, an attacker cannot derive valid return MACs without the key. Future work includes formal verification of the ZRIF state machine and integration with Intel SGX/AMD SEV for enclave return protection. 7. Conclusion We presented ZRIF Key, a hardware primitive that uses a keyed MAC and an isolation flag to protect return addresses against zero-day ROP attacks. By moving return integrity into a hidden CPU register, ZRIF closes a long-standing gap in control-flow integrity without requiring static analysis or separate shadow stack memory. The small performance and hardware cost make it suitable for next-generation secure processors. Keywords : Return-oriented programming, ZRIF key, control-flow integrity, hardware security, trusted execution.
Memory overhead: +8 bytes per return slot vs. +8 bytes for shadow stack + separate region management.