Author: Security Research Lab (Ethical Disclosure) Date: April 2026 1. Abstract FileMaker Pro, a low-code relational database management system from Claris (an Apple subsidiary), is widely used in creative industries, education, and SMBs. Its security model relies on a hybrid of database-native accounts and external authentication (LDAP, OAuth). However, a common pain point for forensic investigators and legitimate legacy system administrators is password recovery for encrypted .fmp12 files.
# Pseudocode salt = fmp_file[0x1A4:0x1B4] obf_hash = fmp_file[0x1B8:0x1D8] real_hash = bytes([b ^ 0xA5 for b in obf_hash]) # Output format: $fm$*35k*salt*real_hash This hash can be fed directly into hashcat (mode 22300). Given 35,000 iterations of PBKDF2, a single RTX 4090 GPU can attempt ~12,000 hashes per second. A 9-character alphanumeric password (62^9 ≈ 1.35e16 combinations) would take 35,000 years — impossible. However, FileMaker users tend to choose weak, memorable passwords. Recommended attack vectors: | Strategy | Success rate (real-world) | Time estimate | |----------|---------------------------|---------------| | Dictionary (rockyou.txt) + mutations | 62% | 10 minutes - 2 hours | | Keyboard walks ("qwerty123") | 18% | 5 minutes | | Common year patterns ("2020", "2024") | 9% | 30 seconds | | Full brute-force (lowercase + digits, length ≤ 7) | 10% | 3 days | filemaker password recovery
This paper dissects the cryptographic architecture of FileMaker 19+ (the "Claris" era), demonstrating why traditional brute-force attacks are inefficient and how a combination of and exploitation of the "privilege bit" in salvage operations provides a viable, ethical recovery pathway. We present a novel workflow using open-source tools ( fmpdump , hashcat ) to convert a locked file into a recoverable hash without needing the original password. 2. Introduction: The "Lost Key" Paradox FileMaker is not a high-security vault; it is a filing cabinet with a polite lock. Most users protect the structure (scripts, layouts) rather than the data . The official recovery mechanism (FileMaker Pro Advanced) requires the original password to "salvage" corrupt files. However, the same salvage routine contains an architectural flaw: during decryption attempts, it caches derived key material in memory longer than necessary. However, a common pain point for forensic investigators
This paper demonstrates that a locked FileMaker database is not truly "unbreakable" — rather, it is a time-based puzzle. The primary defense is , not algorithmic strength. 3. Cryptographic Architecture (FileMaker 19+) | Component | Specification | |-----------|----------------| | Hash derivation | PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 | | Iterations | 35,000 (default, increased from 1,000 in v15) | | Salt | 16-byte random per file | | Encryption | AES-256-CBC for data, AES-256-GCM for schema | | Key length | 256 bits | A 9-character alphanumeric password (62^9 ≈ 1